Motivated by the findings that the aggregate (discretionary) accruals positively predicts oneyear-ahead firm-level stock returns and that there is a considerable amount of co-movement in firm-level (discretionary) accruals, we decompose firm-level (discretionary) accruals into a market-wide component and a firm-specific component. We document robust evidence that the two orthogonal (discretionary) accrual components affect stock returns in qualitatively opposite ways -while the firm-specific component negatively predicts next-period stock returns, firms with a higher level of market-wide component have on average higher next-period stock returns. Moreover, the two accrual-return relations co-exist and the accrual anomaly due to the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals largely supersedes the conventional accrual anomaly documented in Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) . Furthermore, a hedge strategy explicitly exploiting the two accrual anomalies yields a significantly higher return than that of a typical accrual strategy built only on firm-level (discretionary) accruals. Our analysis shows that accounting information such as (discretionary) accruals affects the stock market through both market-wide and firm-specific channels. We briefly discuss potential economic rationales behind each of the two accrual anomalies.
Introduction
One of the robust market anomalies in the empirical asset pricing and accounting literatures is the accrual anomaly, namely, on average, firms with high (discretionary) accruals earn abnormally lower returns than firms with low (discretionary) accruals (Sloan, 1996; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998; Xie, 2001 ). 1 The accrual anomaly has been conventionally referred to as a firm-and portfoliolevel anomaly. Two recent studies find that the (discretionary) accrual-return relation can be generalized to the aggregate level but with an qualitatively opposite sign: both Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh (2008) and Kang, Liu, and Qi (2008) document that different measures of the aggregate accruals positively predict one-year-ahead aggregate stock returns. Kang, Liu, and Qi also provide robust evidence that the accrual-return relation at the aggregate level is mainly driven by the discretionary component of accruals.
The existence of two accrual-return relations at the firm level and at the aggregate level immediately lead to an important research question: are the two relations the same? In other words, is the accrual-return relation at the aggregate level just a manifestation of the conventional accrual anomaly at the firm level or vice versa? If the answer is no, then it would be interesting to examine whether the two distinct accrual-return relations co-exist in a unified empirical setting and whether the different accrual measures affect stock returns in different ways. We address these questions in this paper, aiming to gain further insights on the nature of the accrual anomaly and to improve our understanding of the potential channels through which accounting information such as accruals affects the stock market.
As a motivation, we first study the roles of firm-level (discretionary) accruals and aggregate (discretionary) accruals in predicting firm-level stock returns. We run a time-series regression, for each firm, of the firm's stock returns against the firm's one-year-lagged (discretionary) accruals and the value-weighted (discretionary) aggregate accruals. The predictive coefficient estimates on the firm-level (discretionary) accruals and the aggregate (discretionary) accruals, on average, turn out to be negative and positive, respectively. The finding suggests that the two qualitatively different (discretionary) accrual-return relations coexist in a unified empirical framework and that there might be another accrual "anomaly" -while the negative coefficient estimate on the firmlevel (discretionary) accruals mirrors the conventional accrual anomaly, the significantly positive coefficient estimate on the aggregate (discretionary) accrual measure implies a different sort of accrual anomaly.
In an analogy to the CAPM and/or to the commonality in liquidity, we regress each firmlevel (discretionary) accruals against the aggregate (discretionary) accruals to decompose firmlevel (discretionary) accruals into two components -the residual from the regression, and the co-movement with the aggregate (discretionary) accruals which is captured either by the estimated coefficient on the regressor (β) or by the regression R 2 (See Footnote 4). We find that there exists considerable amount of comovement in firm-level (discretionary) accruals. Note that aggregating the fitted values (excluding intercepts) from this comovement regression across firms yields the aggregate (discretionary) accruals that serves as the market-wide (discretionary) accrual measure (See Footnote 5). Our finding above thus also implies that (discretionary) accruals affects stock returns through both a market-wide channel (i.e., the comovement with the aggregate (discretionary) accruals) and a firm-specific channel (i.e., residuals from the comovement regression). Consequently, we conjecture that there might be two sorts of accrual anomalies driven by different (discretionary) accrual components -the conventional accrual anomaly is mainly due to the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals, and the second accrual anomaly is likely driven by the market-wide component of (discretionary) accruals.
We conduct a battery of tests on this conjecture. In particular, we establish the co-existence and the orthogonality of the two accrual anomalies through both a portfolio test and a regression analysis. The portfolio test evaluates abnormal returns to hedge portfolios formed on the basis of various accrual measures such as the market-wide component of (discretionary) accruals and the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals. The regression analysis enlists various (discretionary) accrual-based return factors constructed from the portfolio test and executes both time-series regressions and cross-sectional regressions. The tests show that the two accrual anomalies are largely orthogonal to each other, and moreover, the accrual anomaly driven by the firm-specific components of total or discretionary accruals largely supersedes the conventional accrual anomaly documented in Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) .
We start with the portfolio test. On the one hand, a standard zero-cost investment strategy taking a long position on stocks with low residuals of the comovement regressions (i.e., the firmspecific component of firm accruals) and a short position on stocks with high residuals yields significant abnormal returns; the magnitude is comparable to that of the conventional accrual anomaly for which stocks are sorted into groups by firm-level accruals. On the other hand, the hedge portfolio holding a long position on stocks with high accrual βs (i.e., the market-wide component of firm accruals) and a short position on stocks with low accrual βs also yields statistically significant abnormal returns, signaling a plausible second accrual anomaly. This dichotomy of the accrualreturn relation becomes more striking in the case of discretionary accruals. As a result, the portfolio test suggests that there are two sorts of accrual anomalies -one is based on the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals; and the other is based on the market-wide component.
Notably, if we apply the comovement regression to the firm-level normal accruals and sort stocks based respectively on the market-wide and firm-specific components of normal accruals, we do not observe either accrual anomaly.
We proceed to do the regression analysis in steps. We first construct factor-mimicking portfolios based on the market-wide component (β and R 2 ) and the firm-specific component (the residual from the comovement regression) of accruals, and label them as AC COM , AC COM R, and AC RES respectively. The factor-mimicking portfolio AC COM (or AC COM R) is formed by taking a long position on stocks with high βs (or R 2 's) and a short position on stocks with low βs (or R 2 's); the portfolio AC RES is formed by holding a long position on stocks with low residuals and a short position on stocks with high residuals. Similarly, we construct another three factor-mimicking portfolios based on the market-wide and firm-specific components of discretionary accruals, and label them as DAC COM , DAC COM R, and DAC RES, respectively. 2 Note that all the six factors earn significantly positive premiums that cannot be explained by the Fama-French four factors.
We then estimate the time-series regressions, in which we regress returns of each decile formed on rankings of firm-level (discretionary) accruals against the various (discretionary) accrual based return factors along with the Fama-French four factors. Several patterns arise from the time-series regressions. First, the six accrual-related return factors all obtain significantly positive loadings across the deciles, suggesting that there is a considerable amount of return comovement associated with either the market-wide component or the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals.
Second, after we control for the factors based on the market-wide component of (discretionary) accruals in the regressions, the conventional accrual anomaly still holds. That is, for the hedge portfolio with a long position on stocks in the bottom (discretionary) accrual decile and a short position on stocks in the top (discretionary) accrual decile, its abnormal returns which are adjusted by Fama-French four factors and the factor due to the market-wide component of (discretionary) accruals remain significantly positive with a magnitude similar to the raw returns. Also, the two findings combined suggest that the two accrual-return relations due respectively to the market-wide component and the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals are likely orthogonal to each other. Third, if we control for the factors based on the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals in the time-series regressions, the conventional accrual anomaly weakens significantly and even disappears. This evidence implies that the conventional accrual anomaly is likely driven by the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals, or that the latter likely supersedes the conventional accrual anomaly.
We further estimate Fama and MacBeth's (1973) cross-sectional regressions on the FamaFrench 10 × 10 size/book-to-market portfolios. The loadings on the various (discretionary) accrual component based factors (e.g., AC COM R, AC RES, DAC COM R, and DAC RES) are strongly positive even in the presence of the Fama-French four factors. The evidence shows that the market-wide component and the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals are both significantly and positively related to the cross-sectional variations in average returns, thereby lending support to the co-existence and the orthogonality of the two accrual anomalies.
Given the above findings, we venture to gauge the economic significance of the two accrualreturn relations. We design a hedging strategy that explicitly exploits the return-predicability with the two different components of (discretionary) accruals. We find that the hedge portfolio taking a long position on stocks with both low accrual residuals and high accrual βs (or R 2 's) and a short position on stocks with both high accrual residuals and low accrual βs (or R 2 's) yields significantly higher abnormal returns than that of a hedge portfolio based only on the conventional accrual anomaly. Specifically, taking into account the return effect of the market-wide component of firm-level accruals (or discretionary accruals) improves the performance of a pure accrual strategy by 32-86% (or 50-112%). This evidence not only pinpoints the economic magnitude of the two accrual anomalies but also further demonstrates the existence and distinctness of the two accrual anomalies.
Our paper makes several incremental contributions to the accrual literature and the asset pricing literature. First, we show that the conventional accrual anomaly is due to the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals. Moreover, on top of the conventional accrual anomaly, there is a second accrual anomaly that is driven by the market-wide component of (discretionary) accruals. We further show that the two accrual anomalies co-exist and they are largely orthogonal to each other. Second, we identify strong evidence of co-movement in firm-level (discretionary) accruals, based on which we introduce a novel way to decompose (discretionary) accruals. We document robust evidence that the different components of (discretionary) accruals affect stock returns in different ways. Third, our analysis helps understand the nature of the accrual-return relation, and our findings demonstrate that accounting information such as (discretionary) accruals affects stock returns through both market-wide and firm-specific channels. Fourth, our analysis creates several new factors based on different (discretionary) accrual components and show that those factors exhibit the power independent from the Fama-French four factors to account for crosssectional differences in stock returns. Last but not the least, our findings pose several interesting questions for future research. For example, are the two accrual anomalies risk-based or behaviorbased? How do the two accrual anomalies distribute across firms, industries, and business cycles?
How do the factors constructed based on different (discretionary) accrual components relate to other well-documented factors such as size, value, momentum, etc.? Further efforts to address those remaining questions are important and can help uncover the ultimate economic rationales behind the two accrual anomalies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes data and offers details on how we construct various factor-mimicking portfolios based on different (discretionary) accrual components. Section 3 discusses the motivation and present the evidence of the existence of a second accrual anomaly. Section 4 explores the relations among the various accrual anomalies.
Section 5 demonstrates the economic magnitudes of the two accrual anomalies and discusses potential economic rationales behind each of the accrual anomalies. Section 6 concludes.
Data and Variable Constructions
We conduct the empirical analysis using all the U.S. firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with December fiscal year ends but excluding financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999).
Because sufficient accounting information for calculating accruals and discretionary accruals is not available prior to 1965, our sample spans the period from 1965 to 2005. We obtain accounting data and stock return data from Standard & Poor's Compustat database and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, respectively. The total number of firm-year observations in our sample is 36,585.
Accrual Measures
We rely on the balance-sheet method (Sloan, 1996) to calculate accruals throughout our empirical analysis as the data on cash flow statement are only available after 1987:
where ∆CA = change in current assets ( . Following Sloan (1996) , we scale a firm's accruals by the firm's average total assets (T A,
Compustat item 6) from the beginning to the end of a fiscal year.
Because Xie (2001) and Kang et al. (2008) respectively find that the accrual-return relations at the disaggregate and aggregate levels are driven by discretionary components of accruals, we also use discretionary accruals in our empirical analysis. We use the cross-sectional Jones' (1991) model to compute firm-level discretionary accruals. 3 The model is specified as follows:
where ∆Rev it is the change in revenues in year t (Compustat item 12) and P P E it is gross property, plant, and equipment in year t (Compustat item 7). We estimate equation (2) year by year and for each two-digit SIC industry, and we require each industry to contain at least ten firms. We compute normal accruals and discretionary accruals respectively as the fitted value and the residual from Equation (2).
We then calculate the value-weighted aggregate accruals (AAC), weighted by each firm's market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal year. To reduce the potential impact of outliers, we delete from our sample the firms whose accruals are ranked at the top and bottom 0.5 percentiles.
(Our main results remain quantitatively similar if we retain those observations or if we truncate the sample at other percentiles.) Likewise, we compute the value-weighted aggregate normal accruals (AN AC) and the value-weighted aggregate discretionary accruals (ADAC).
As our goal is to examine the effects of different components of accrual measures on stock returns, we decompose a firm's accruals (AC it ) into two components as follows:
where AC it is firm i's accruals in year t, AAC t stands for the value-weighted aggregate accruals in year t. For each sample firm in year t, we run the regression over a ten-year period from years t − 10 to t − 1, and we denote by F IT AC it and RESAC it the fitted value and the residual from Equation (3), respectively.
It is easy to show that both the estimated coefficient on the regressor, β it , and the regression R 2 from Equation (3) capture the co-movement of firm i's accruals, AC it , with the aggregate accruals, 3 For robustness, we also estimate the time-series Jones' (1991) model firm by firm to decompose the total accruals into discretionary accruals and normal accruals. Besides the Jones'(1991) model, we use other accrual-decomposition models such as Dechow et al. (1995) , Dechow et al. (1998) , and Dechow and Dichev (2002) . The results using the alternative accrual decomposition models are similar to the results as reported in the text. Moreover, our results are robust to an alternative discretionary accruals measure that controls for accounting conservatism. For brevity we do not report those results and they are available upon request.
AAC t . 4 The two variables are thus proxies for the market-wide component of firm-level accruals for firm i in year t. Accordingly, RESAC it , the residual from Equation (3), measures the firmspecific component of accruals for firm i in year t. Further note that aggregating the fitted values excluding the intercepts from the decomposition equation across firms yields the aggregate accrual measure. 5 Our decomposition of firm-level accrual AC it may appear to be mechanical for the time being, and we defer to Section 3 to explain the motivation and the economic rationales of such a decomposition.
Similarly, we decompose a firm's discretionary accruals (DAC it ) into both the market-wide and firm-specific components as follows:
where ADAC t stands for the value-weighted aggregate discretionary accruals in year t. Again, for each sample firm in year t we run the time-series regression over the period from years t−10 to t−1, and we denote by F IT DAC it and RESDAC it the fitted value and the residual from Equation (4), respectively.
Construction of Factors
Our empirical analysis enlists several other variables. We obtain the Fama-French four factors, To perform our empirical analysis, we construct various (discretionary) accrual-measure-based return factors in a way similar to the construction of the Fama-French factors. We start with the accrual-based components. We construct three factor-mimicking portfolios, AC COM , AC COM R, and AC RES, based respectively on the market-wide accrual component, measured 4 In a univariate regression such as y=a + bx + e, the estimated coefficient on the regressor, b=ρx,y σy σx , and the
x,y , where ρx,y is the correlation coefficient between x and y. 5 It is easy to show that wiβiX=X because wiβi=1, where wi is the weight attached to firm i, and βi is the coefficient estimate from the following univariate regression for firm i: yi=αi + βiX + e, with X ≡ wiyi.
by β and R 2 from Equation (3), and the firm-specific accrual component, measured by the residual from Equation (3). Take AC RES as an example. We first estimate for each firm Equation (3) over the period from year t − 10 to year t − 1, and we rank the firms into three portfolios according to the residuals from Equation (3), where the top and bottom groups each contain 30% of the sample firms. We then match the firm-level accounting data with monthly stock returns over the period from April of year t through March of year t + 1. 6 We further compute the equal-weighted monthly returns on each of the three residual-based portfolios, and we obtain AC RES as the monthly return Similarly, we construct another three factor-mimicking portfolios based on the market-wide and firm-specific components of discretionary accruals. They are labeled, in the same order, as DAC COM , DAC COM R, and DAC RES. The first two factors measure the the impact on stock returns by the market-wide component of firm-level discretionary accruals; and the latter captures the return effect of the firm-specific component of firm-level discretionary accruals.
We also adopt the similar approach to construct two other factor-mimicking portfolios, AC F actor and DAC F actor, which are based on rankings of firm-level accruals and firm-level discretionary accruals, respectively. Again, in forming the two portfolios, the stocks are assigned to different groups according to their year-end (discretionary) accruals in year t − 1 and the portfolio returns are computed on a monthly basis from April of year t until March of year t + 1.
Finally, note that, due to the way of constructing the factor-mimicking portfolios based on the various accrual components as described above, the sample for the accrual-related factors spans the period from 1980 to 2005 in our ensuing analysis. constructed based on different components of (discretionary) accruals. Table 1 shows that both the mean and the median of the firm-level accruals (AC it ), firm-level discretionary accruals (DAC it ) and their corresponding aggregate-level measures are all negative; both the mean and the median of the factor returns based on (discretionary) accrual components are positive and significantly different from zero.
Descriptive Statistics
We will discuss in detail the return factors based on (discretionary) accruals and their various components in Section 3. Here, as an informal start, we plot in Figure 1 the cumulative returns of the four total accrual based return factors: AC f actor, AC COM , AC COM R, and AC RES. While the dynamic behavior of DAC f actor and DAC RES follows similar pattern, the dynamic behavior of DAC COM and DAC COM R is quite different. Table 2 presents the correlations among those return factors. Panel A of Table 2 may co-exist in a unified empirical framework. More important, the two return effects of accruals may capture distinctly different accrual-return relations. We set out to explore these issues in this section.
Motivation
To motivate our investigation of a potential second accrual anomaly, we first study whether the aggregate (discretionary) accrual measures, together with firm-level (discretionary) accruals, also affect firm-level stock returns. We run the following predictive regressions, for each firm, of the firm's stock returns against its one-year-lagged accruals AC it−1 (discretionary accruals DAC it−1 ) and/or one-year-lagged value-weighted aggregate accruals AAC t−1 (aggregate discretionary accruals ADAC t−1 ) over the 1965-2005 period:
where R it is firm i's annual stock returns compounded from April of year t to March of year t + 1;
and R f t is the annual risk-free rate compounded from April of year t to March of year t + 1. We run a time-series regression of Equation (5) or Equation (6) for each firm in our sample with at least ten observations of data in the sample period. We summarize and report the cross-sectional statistics for the estimates.
In Equations (5) or (6) Table 3 reports the cross-sectional averages, t-values of the cross-sectional averages, and the cross-sectional medians of the estimation results from the firm-level predictive regressions as in Equation (5). In Model (1), only firm-level accruals, AC it , are included as the independent variable, the cross-sectional average value of this predictive coefficient, m, is negative at -0.212 with a tvalue of -2.796, and the value of the cross-sectional median is -0.180. This finding confirms the conventional accrual anomaly that firm-level accruals negatively relate to next-period stock returns.
In Model (2), we use the value-weighted aggregate accruals (AAC t ) as the sole return predictor.
The cross-sectional average value of this predictive coefficient is positive at 5.932 with a t-value of 17.357, and the value of the cross-sectional median is 4.559. The positive sign of l indicates that the aggregate accruals positively predicts firm-level stock returns, which constitutes a potential second accrual anomaly.
In Model (3) we include both AC it and AAC t as return predictors, and find that m is still significantly negative and l is significantly positive. The firm-level stock return predicability of AC it and AC t co-exists in our predictive regression. The co-existence is also reflected in the adjusted R 2 from the regressions. When the aggregate accruals (AAC t ) is added as a regressor, the crosssectional average of adjusted R 2 increases from 0.6% to 2.2%. The return predictive power of AAC t is distinct and it is also different from that of AC it .
Models (4) to (6) replicate the same regressions for discretionary accrual measures. We take
Model (6) as the example, where both firm-level discretionary accruals (DAC it ) and the valueweighted aggregate discretionary accruals (ADAC t ) are included. We find strong evidence that m is significantly negative and l is significantly positive, suggesting the cohabitation of the two distinct return-predicability with the two different discretionary accrual measures.
The empirical evidence in Table 3 implies that there might be a second accrual anomaly.
The contrast in the return effects of the firm-level (discretionary) accruals versus the aggregate (discretionary) accruals also suggests that investors respond asymmetrically to the firm-level and the aggregate (discretionary) accruals.
Co-movement in Firm-level (Discretionary) Accruals
Given the return predicability with the firm-level (discretionary) accruals and the aggregate (discretionary) accruals, one may conjecture that (discretionary) accruals may affect stock returns through both a firm-specific channel (i.e., the conventional accrual anomaly) and a market-wide channel (i.e., the second accrual anomaly). To test this conjecture, we first establish in this section the evidence that there is a considerable amount of co-movement in firm-level (discretionary) accruals. That is, firm-level (discretionary) accruals co-move with the aggregate (discretionary) accruals which serves as a market-wide measure.
We estimate Equation (3), where individual firm's accrual (AC it ) is regressed against contemporaneous value-weighted aggregate accruals (AAC t ), for each firm in our sample. We then compute the cross-sectional average coefficient estimates, t-statistics, average adjusted R 2 , percentage of positive coefficients, and percentage of positive significant coefficient (with t-statistics larger than 1.645 in absolute value). We report the results in Panel A of Table 4 . We replicate the same analysis by estimating Equation (4), in which firm-level discretionary accruals (DAC it )
is regressed against the value-weighted aggregate discretionary accruals (ADAC t ). We report the results in Panel B of Table 4 .
We examine the results in Panel A first. For the pooled sample, the estimated coefficient on AAC t is 0.709 and it is statistically significant (average t-statistics is 5.99). The average adjusted R 2 is 6% and about 73% of firms have positive β. The evidence suggests that firm-level accruals exhibits a considerable co-movement with a market-wide factor (AAC t here). Panel A also shows that as firm size increases and the estimated coefficient, adjusted R 2 from the regression all increase monotonically, suggesting that larger firms demonstrate a higher degree of co-movement. Results reported in Panel B show the same patterns. We observe a considerable co-movement in firm-level discretionary accruals (DAC it ) and the degree of such co-movement increases with firm size.
Portfolio Tests: Existence of Two Accrual Anomalies
The finding from Table 4 suggests another way to decompose firm-level (discretionary) accrual measures -they can be decomposed into a market-wide component and a firm-specific component.
As we explain in Section 2, the former can be captured by either β or adjusted R 2 from the co-movement regressions, and the latter by the residuals from Equations (3) or (4) . Note that aggregating the fitted values (excluding the intercepts) from the decomposition equation across firms yields the aggregate (discretionary) accrual measure. Thus, the aggregate (discretionary) accrual measures, by ways of construction and by their very nature, correspond to the market-wide component of firm-level (discretionary) accruals. We thus conjecture that the conventional accrual anomaly is mainly due to the firm-specific component of accruals, and the return-predicability with the aggregate (discretionary) accrual measures is largely driven by the market-wide component of accruals.
We test the conjecture by applying the standard hedge portfolio test, which evaluates abnormal returns to hedge portfolios formed on the basis of accrual measures such as the market-wide component of (discretionary) accruals and the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals.
We construct the hedge portfolio following the way the Fama-French factors such as SM B, HM L, and U M D are constructed. Specifically, we sort the stocks into the top 30%, the middle 40%, and the bottom 30% based on a certain (discretionary) accrual measure, then we compute the equal-weighted raw return and the Fama-French four-factor-adjusted return to a standard zeroinvestment strategy with a long position on stocks in the bottom group and a short position on stocks in the top group.
Panel A of Table 5 reports the results of hedge portfolio tests using accrual measures. When we sort the stocks based on firm-level accruals (AC it ), we find that the hedge portfolio yields an average monthly Fama-French-four-factor adjusted abnormal return of 0.267%, confirming the existence of the accrual anomaly. When we sort the stocks by accrual β from the estimation of Equation (3), we document the average monthly Fama-French-four-factor adjusted abnormal return to the hedge portfolio is 0.105%. And when we sort the stocks based on R 2 from the estimation of Equation (3), we find that the hedge portfolio yields an average monthly Fama-French-four-factor adjusted abnormal return of 0.159%. In the case of sorting stocks using β and R 2 , we find a different accrual anomaly because the stocks are sorted based on the market-wide component of accruals, but not by accruals. We also find that when we sort stocks based on the residual from Equation (3), the hedge portfolio yields an average monthly abnormal return of 0.271%, which is in line with the magnitude of the conventional accrual anomaly (0.267%) when stocks are sorted by firm-level accruals.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the results of using discretionary accrual measures. Specifically, when we sort the stocks into portfolios by firm-level discretionary accruals, we find that a standard zero-investment strategy with a long position on stocks with a low level of DAC it and a short position on stocks with a high level of DAC it yields an average monthly Fama-French-four-factor adjusted abnormal return of 0.302%. When we sort stocks into portfolios based on the residuals from Equation 4 , we find that the hedge portfolio yields an abnormal return of -0.264%. Its magnitude is similar to that of the conventional accrual anomaly. However, when we sort stocks into portfolio based on β from Equation 4, the hedge portfolio with a long position on stocks with a high level of β and a short position on stocks with a low level of β yields an monthly average FamaFrench-four-factor adjusted abnormal return of 0.232% (t-statistics = 3.04). Sorting stocks based on R 2 from Equation 4, the hedge portfolio also yields a statistically significant abnormal return of 0.153% (t-statistic = 1.79). The market-wide component of discretionary accruals, captured by either β or adjusted R 2 from Equation (4), causes an accrual-related anomaly that is different from the one driven by the firm-specific component of discretionary accruals.
Panel C of Table 5 reports the results of using normal accrual measures. We do not observe either the conventional accrual anomaly or the two anomalies due to different components of normal accruals. We thus conclude that the conventional accrual anomaly and the two accrual anomalies due to firm-specific component and market-wide component of (discretionary) accruals only apply to accruals and/or discretionary accruals but not on normal accruals.
Regression Analysis: Relations Among Different Accrual Anomalies
Our analysis so far establishes the dichotomy of the (discretionary) accrual-return relations, which represents two different accrual anomalies -one is driven by the firm-specific component and the other is driven by the market-wide component of (discretionary) accruals. By construction, the two accruals anomalies are distinct and are likely to be orthogonal to each other. Notably, the hedge portfolio sorted by the residuals from either Equation (3) or Equation (4) yields an abnormal return that is in a similar magnitude to the hedge portfolio sorted by firm-level (discretionary) accruals, implying that the accrual anomaly due to the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals may supersede the conventional accrual anomaly. We explore the relations among the two accrual anomalies and the conventional accrual anomaly in this section.
Time-series Regressions
To study the relations among the different types of accrual anomalies, we employ the return factors constructed in Section 2. Recall that we construct four return factors based on the total accrual measures, AC f actor, AC RES, AC COM and AC COM R, and another set of four return factors based on the discretionary accrual measures, DAC f actor, DAC RES, DAC COM and
Panel A of Table 6 replicates analysis of the conventional accrual anomaly in Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) . We first sort the stocks into deciles by firm-level accruals (AC it ) and then regress the returns to portfolios against the Fama-French four factors. The estimated coefficient of the intercept (α) thus measure the monthly abnormal returns after adjusting for the Fama-French four factors.
7 Note that in our notations, AC f actor and DAC f actor correspond to the conventional accrual anomaly; AC COM , AC COM R, DAC COM and DAC COM R are all related to the accrual anomaly due to the marketwide component of total accruals or discretionary accruals; and finally, AC RES and DAC RES reflect the accrual anomaly due to the firm-specific component of total accruals or discretionary accruals.
As shown in Panel A, the hedge portfolio with a long position on stocks in the bottom accrual decile and a short position on stocks in the top accrual decile yields a monthly Fama-French-four-factor adjusted abnormal return of 0.351% (t-statistic = 2.08). The second part of Panel A shows that the hedge portfolio with a long position on stocks in the bottom discretionary accrual decile and a short position on stocks in the top discretionary accrual decile yields a monthly Fama-French-four-factor adjusted abnormal return of 0.575% (t-statistic = 3.91).
The results in Panel A are retained for the purpose of comparison. In Panel B, in addition to the Fama-French four factors, we include the returns to the factor-mimicking portfolio constructed based on the firm-specific (discretionary) accrual component (AC RES and DAC RES respectively) as explanatory variable. We regress the excess returns to (discretionary) accrual deciles (R pt − R f t ) on the five return factors. As shown in the first part of Panel B, the estimated coefficients of AC RES across all accrual deciles are statistically significant. More interestingly, the hedge portfolio constructed based on the firm-level accruals (AC it ) no longer generates an abnormal return after controlling for the return factor based on the firm-specific accrual component (AC RES t ). That is, after controlling for AC RES, the conventional accrual anomaly disappears.
The evidence suggests that the firm-specific accrual component explains stock returns that cannot be accounted for by the Fama-French four factors, and provides a direct support for the argument that the accrual anomaly due to the firm-specific component of accruals supersedes the conventional accrual anomaly.
The second part of Panel B report the results using the return factor based on the firm-specific component of discretionary accruals, DAC RES. The loadings on this factor are statistically significant in almost all discretionary accrual deciles. We also find that when this factor is added, the conventional accrual anomaly becomes much weaker -the hedge portfolio that is long on stocks in the bottom discretionary accrual decile and short on stocks in the top discretionary accrual decile yields an abnormal return of 0.250%, which is less than half of the abnormal return without controlling for DAC RES (which equals 0.575%). Clearly, a large part of the conventional accrual anomaly can be accounted for by the firm-specific component of the discretionary accruals.
In Panels C and D, we include the return factors constructed based on the market-wide (discretionary) accrual components to the regressions. Two findings surface immediately. First, the estimated coefficients on those return factors, e.g., AC COM , DAC COM , AC COM R, DAC COM R, are statistically significant in most (discretionary) accrual deciles. The evidence indicates that there is considerable return co-movement associated with the market-wide component of (discretionary) accruals as well. In addition, the return effect of the market-wide (discretionary) accrual component is robust to the Fama-French four factors, signaling the existence of a second accrual anomaly.
Second, we find that the hedge portfolio based on firm-level (discretionary) accruals still yields significant abnormal returns after controlling for the returns to factor-mimicking portfolio constructed based on the market-wide component of (discretionary) accruals. For example, the standard zero-investment hedge portfolio with a long position on stocks in the bottom accrual decile and a short position on stocks in the top accrual decile yields an average monthly abnormal return of 0.367% (t-statistics = 2.17) after adding AC COM . While AC COM is priced, the abnormal return to the hedge portfolio is at par with that of the conventional accrual anomaly which, as reported in Panel A, has the abnormal return of 0.351%. That is, the conventional accrual anomaly still holds after controlling for the return effect of the market-wide accrual component, suggesting that there are two different types of accrual anomalies.
In summary, the findings in Table 6 lead to two conclusions. First of all, the two accrual anomalies, which are driven by different components of (discretionary) accruals, co-exist and are likely orthogonal to each other. Second, the accrual anomaly driven by the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals largely supersedes the conventional accrual anomaly. Therefore, the two accrual anomalies can be interchangeably classified as the conventional accrual anomaly in the sense of Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) , and a new accrual anomaly driven by the market-wide component of (discretionary) accruals. 8 
Relating the Accrual Based Factors to Fama-French Factors
We further examine whether the various return factors constructed based on different (discretionary) accrual components reflect known factors commonly used in empirical studies such as the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum. If true, the intercepts from the regressions of 8 The two accrual anomalies in our paper thus have two combinations: one is the conventional accrual anomaly plus the accrual anomaly based on the market-wide component of (discretionary) accruals; and the other is the accrual anomaly due to the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals plus the accrual anomaly due to the market-wide component of (discretionary) accruals. the (discretionary) accrual based factors against the set of known factors should be zero, and the R 2 of these regressions should be high. Table 7 
Cross-sectional Regressions
We provide further evidence on the existence and orthogonality of the two accrual anomalies using Fama and French's 10 × 10 size/book-to-market portfolios as test assets. We follow Fama and MacBeth's (1973) approach to conduct the two-pass cross-sectional testing. Specifically, in the first pass, for each portfolio at each time t, we run a time-series regression of its monthly excess returns against the Fama-French four factors and the various (discretionary) accrual-based factors over the past 60 months from t − 60 to t − 1. In the second pass, we run a cross-sectional regression of the 100 portfolio returns at time t against the portfolios' factor loadings estimated from the first-pass time-series regressions to obtain the premiums associated with the loadings. We then repeat the two-path regressions for each month t and use the Fama-MacBeth method to compute the average premiums and their t-statistics. We report the results in Table 8 . Table 8 If we use the various factors constructed on the basis of discretionary accruals in the two-path regression (Models 6 to 10 in Table 8 ), we obtain similar results. Notably, when both DAC COM R and DAC RES are present (Model 10), the coefficient estimate on the loading of DAC COM R is still significantly positive, indicating the robustness of the accrual anomaly due to the marketwide component of firm-level discretionary accruals. The estimate of the loading on DAC RES is positive and insignificant, though. It seems that the two accrual anomalies are less robust in the case of the discretionary accruals.
In Model 1 of

Further Evidence and Discussions
The Economic Magnitude of the Two Accrual Anomalies
We have so far established robust evidence that there are two accrual anomalies, and that the accrual anomaly due to firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals supersedes the conventional accrual anomaly. We also show evidence that two accrual anomalies are largely orthogonal to each other. In this section, we study the economic magnitude of the two accrual anomalies. Specifically, we examine the abnormal returns to a hedge portfolio constructed based on a conditional two-way sort: first by (discretionary) accruals or the firm-specific (discretionary) accrual component and then by the market-wide (discretionary) accrual component. 9 We form those portfolios at each year-end of year t − 1 and hold the portfolios from April of year t to March of year t + 1. We then compute the average monthly Fama-French-four-factor adjusted returns to each portfolio over the 1980-2005 sample period. We report the results in Table 9 .
In Panel A of Table 9 , we sort the stocks into 3 × 3 portfolios first by the firm-level accruals (AC it ) and then by the market-wide component of accruals (β and R 2 from Equation (3)). That is, we first sort the stocks into three equal-sized groups based on AC it , and within each group we further sort the stocks into three equal-sized subgroups based on either β or R 2 from Equation (3).
As shown in Panel A, the hedge portfolio taking a long position on stocks with low accruals (AC it ) and a short position on stocks with high accruals yields an average monthly abnormal return of 0.280% (t-statistic = 2.81), which also shows the magnitude of the conventional accrual anomaly in our sample period. In contrast, the hedge strategy that exploits the two accrual anomalies -a long position on stocks with a low level of accruals and a high level of β and a short position on stock with a high level of accruals and a low level of β -yields an average monthly abnormal return of 0.277% (t-statistic = 2.00). However, the conventional accrual strategy, if limited to the stocks with a high level of β only, yields an average monthly abnormal return of 0.468%, representing a 67% increase from that of the conventional accrual strategy applied to all firms. Further, another hedge strategy exploiting the two accrual anomalies -a long position on stocks with a low level of accruals and a high level of R 2 and a short position on stock with a high level of accruals and a low level of R 2 -yields an average monthly abnormal return of 0.453%, representing a 62% increase relative to the payoffs of the conventional accrual strategy. Obviously, the economic magnitude of the second accrual anomaly is significant when R 2 from Equation (3) is used to capture the market-wide component of firm-level accruals.
In Panel B, we first sort stocks into three groups based on the discretionary accruals (DAC it ), and then within each group we further sort stocks into three equal-sized subgroups based on either β or R 2 from Equation (4). The pure discretionary accrual hedge strategy (Xie, 2001 ) yields an average monthly abnormal return of 0.273% (t-statistic = 4.12). The enhanced hedge strategy, which take advantages of the return effect due to the market-wide component of discretionary accruals, yields a much larger abnormal return. Specifically, the hedge portfolio taking a long position on stocks with low discretionary accruals and high βs and a short position on stock with high discretionary accruals and low βs yields an abnormal return of 0.513% (t-statistic =4.29), representing an 88% increase from that of a pure discretionary accrual strategy. The similar enhanced hedge strategy yields an abnormal return of 0.362% when R 2 is used to measure the market-wide component of discretionary accruals.
The two-way sort used in Panel C of Table 9 deviates slightly from those in Panel A. Here we sort the stocks into 3 × 3 portfolios first by the firm-specific accrual component (residuals from Equation (3)) and then by the market-wide accrual component (β or R 2 ). As shown in Panel C, a hedge strategy with a long position on stocks with a low level of residuals and a short position on stocks with a high level of residuals yields an average monthly abnormal return of 0.320% (tstatistic = 4.36), and the magnitude is comparable to that of the conventional accrual strategy.
When we sort the stocks by both residuals and β from Equation (3), the hedge strategy taking a long position on stocks with a low level of residuals and a high level of β and taking a short position on stocks with a high level of residuals and a low level of β yields an average monthly abnormal return of 0.455% (t-statistic = 3.52), representing a 42% improvement from the hedge strategy built solely on residuals. When we sort the stocks by both residuals and R 2 from Equation (3), the hedge strategy taking a long position on stocks with a low level of residuals but a high level of R 2 and taking a short position on stocks with a high level of residuals but a low level of R 2 yields an average monthly abnormal return of 0.506% (t-statistic = 3.96), which represents a 58% increase.
Finally, in Panel D, we sort the stocks into 3×3 portfolios first by the firm-specific discretionary accrual component (residuals from Equation (4)) and then by the market-wide discretionary accrual component (β or R 2 ). Panel D shows that a hedge strategy taking a long position on stocks with a low level of residuals and a short position on stocks with a high level of residuals yields an average abnormal return of 0.275% (t-statistic = 3.94), and the magnitude is comparable to that of a pure hedge strategy sorting stocks by discretionary accruals only. When we sort the stocks by both residuals and β from Equation (4), the hedge strategy holding a long position on stocks with a low level of residuals but a high level of β and holding a short position on stocks with a high level of residuals but a low level of β yields an average monthly abnormal return of 0.571% (t-statistic = 4.59), representing a 108% improvement from the hedge strategy built solely on discretionary accrual residuals. When we sort the stocks by both residuals and R 2 , the hedge strategy yields a moderate abnormal return of 0.317%, which also represents a 16% increase from the pure hedge strategy built on residuals only.
Discussions
Our analysis shows that there are more than just one accrual anomalies, and that the firmspecific and market-wide components of (discretionary) accruals affect stock returns in distinct ways. However, our results are silent about the economic rationales behind each of the two accrual anomalies. Here we discuss various plausible economic rationales underling the two accrual anomalies without offering substantive empirical evidence.
The coexistence of the two qualitatively opposite accrual anomalies -one is driven by the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals and the other by the market-wide component of (discretionary) accruals -suggests that accounting information such as total accruals and discretionary accruals may affect stock return through different channels. The underlying incentives behind the two (discretionary) accrual components are likely to be very different. If we interpret firm-level (discretionary) accruals as a proxy for firm-level earnings management, then our results imply that firms may manage earnings in response to both firm-specific shocks and market-wide shocks. Further research along this line may greatly improve our understanding of the nature of (discretionary) accruals' return effects. Here we discuss the extant research and explore what incentives motivate firm managers to manage earnings in response to both firm-specific shocks and market-wide shocks.
On the firm-specific shocks, a large literature discusses the managerial incentives to manage earnings as a response to firm-level shocks. For example, Dye (1988) that CEOs report accounting income so as to increase their compensation and that the relation is causal. Sloan (1993) shows that accounting earnings are much less sensitive to macroeconomic risk than stock returns and accounting profits are more closely correlated with market-adjusted stock returns than with raw returns. Recently, Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2006) provide systematic evidence that managers delay the dissemination of bad news. Given the contractual arrangement, the incentive of earnings management is likely to be stronger when the aggregate market is perceived to be weak. If a negative shock hits the stock market and causes a gap between firm performance and analyst or investor expectations, such capital market incentives to manage earnings are likely to be higher. It is also worth noting that earnings management is potentially costly to firms and managers. The increased worries about potential litigation related to financial reporting may place constraints on the exercise of managerial opportunism -firm managers thus may choose to time the aggregate equity market rather than their own stock performance to manage earnings.
If a negative shock hits the stock market and causes a gap between firm performance and capital market expectations, such incentives to manage earnings are likely to be high. This explains why we find the market-wide component of (discretionary) accruals affect stock returns.
Conclusion
In this paper, we motivate our empirical analysis by the findings that the aggregate (discretionary) accruals positively predict one-year-ahead firm-level stock returns, and that there is a considerable amount of co-movement in firm-level (discretionary) accruals. We introduce a novel way to decompose firm-level (discretionary) accruals into a market-wide component and a firm-specific component. We provide robust empirical evidence that the two different components affect stock returns in different ways and drive two different accrual anomalies. While the firm-specific component negatively predicts next-period stock returns, firms with a higher level of the marketwide component have on average higher next-period stock returns. We show that the two accrual anomalies co-exist and the accrual anomaly due to the firm-specific component of (discretionary) accruals largely supersedes the conventional accrual anomaly documented in Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) . We offer further evidence that the two accrual anomalies are distinct and likely orthogonal to each other. Given the potential orthogonality of the two accrual anomalies, we design a hedge strategy that explicitly exploits the different roles of the two (discretionary) accrual components (firm-specific versus market-wide) in affecting stock returns. We find that the hedge portfolio yields an abnormal return significantly higher than that of a typical accrual strategy built only on firm-level (discretionary) accruals.
We also briefly discuss potential economic rationales behind the two accrual anomalies. Our preliminary analysis appears to suggest that firm managers manage earnings in response to both market-wide shocks and firm-specific shocks. Further research is called for to examine which firms are more likely to manage earnings in response to market-wide shocks and which firms are more likely to manage earnings in response to firm-specific shocks. Our paper shows that accounting information such as (discretionary) accruals impacts on the stock market through both marketwide and firm-specific channels.
Table 1 Summary Statistics of Main Variables 1965 -2005
For all U.S. firms (excluding financial firms -firms with SIC code between 6000 and 6999) on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with December fiscal year end and coverage on both CRSP and Compustat, we compute their accruals scaled by average total assets (AC i t ) as in Sloan (1996) . The total number of observation is 36,585 for the period from 1965 to 2005. We also compute the value weighted aggregate accruals in year t for the firms in our sample (AAC t ). Using the Jones' (1991) model to decompose accruals into discretionary accruals (DAC i,,t ) and normal accruals (NAC i,t ), we compute value-weighted aggregate discretionary accruals (ADAC t ) and valueweighted normal accruals (ANAC t ). We also construct eight accrual based factor-mimicking portfolios. For each firm at each portfolio-formation year-end in year t-1, we run the comovement regression of firm-level accruals or discretionary accruals (AC i,t , or DAC i,t ) against their corresponding aggregate variables (AAC t or ADAC t ,) over the period from years t-10 to t-1:
We sort the sample firms into three portfolios (top 30%, medium 40%, and bottom 30%) based on respective β values, R squares, and residuals from the above regressions. The first two measures capture the market-wide component of accruals (discretionary accruals) and the last one captures the firm-specific component of accruals (discretionary accruals). We compute the monthly equal-weighted returns on each portfolio over the holding period from April of year t to March of year t+1. We then calculate the returns on the accrual-based factor-mimicking portfolio, AC_factor (the spread of the returns on a portfolio of stocks with low accruals over the returns on a portfolio of stocks with high accruals), AC_COM t (the difference between the returns on a portfolio of stocks with high βs and the returns on a portfolio of stocks with low βs); AC_COMR t (the definition is similar to that of AC_COM t , but stocks are sorted by R 2 ); and AC_RES t (the definition is similar to that of AC_factor , , but stocks are sorted by residuals). DAC_factor, DAC_COM, DAC_COMR, and DAC_RES are constructed in the same way using different terms from the comovement regression based on the discretionary accruals. We also use the monthly Fama-French four factors obtained from Ken French's website: R mt -R ft is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index over the risk-free rate, SMB t , HML t , and UMD t are the factors measuring size, value, and momentum effects, respectively. All the numbers in the Table 1 for definitions). The sample period is from 1980 to 2005. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. (Table 1 defines the factors). We follow a twopass approach. In the first pass, at each month t, we estimate for each portfolio the factor loadings from a time-series regression using monthly excess returns over the period from month t-60 to month t-1. In the second pass, for each month t, we estimate a cross-sectional regression using the estimated factor loadings as independent variables. We repeat the two-pass regression for each month, and we follow the Fama-MacBeth approach to report in the table the averages and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the cross-sectional regressions. For brevity, we only report the results of using AC_COMR and DAC_COMR as market-wide (discretionary) accrual factors (using AC_COM and DAC_COM yields similar results). The sample period is from January 1980 to December 2005. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 9 Returns to the Hedge Portfolio Based on the Two Accrual Anomalies
The sample contains all US firms (excluding financial firms, that is, firms with SIC code between 6000 and 6999) on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with December fiscal year end and coverage on both CRSP and Compustat. For each firm at each portfolio-formation year-end of year t-1, we run the co-movement regression of firm-level accruals (AC i,t ) or discretionary accruals (DAC i t ) against the contemporaneous aggregate accruals (AAC t ) or aggregate discreationary accruals (ADAC t ) over the period from years t-10 to t-1. We use a conditional two-way sort to form 3x3 equal-weighted portfolios and hold the portfolios from April of year t to March of year t+1. We calculate and report for each portfolio the Fama-French four-factor-adjusted returns (i.e., Jensen's α) and the corresponding t-statistics (in parentheses) in the table. In Panels A and B, we first sort the stocks into three equal-sized groups based on firm-level accruals (AC it ) or discretionary accruals (DAC i t ), then within each group, we further sort the stocks into another three equal-sized subgroups based on either the estimated coefficients (β) or the R 2 from the comovement regressions. In Panel C and D, we first sort the firms using the residuals from the comovement regression and then sort them either by β or the R 2 from the comovement regressions. The sample period is 1980 to 2005. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 1 for definitions of those factors). The sample period is January 1980 to December 2005. 
Figure 2 Monthly Cumulative Returns to Discretionary Accrual based Factors
This figure plots the monthly cumulative equal-weighted returns to the four different discretionary accrual based factors: DAC_factor, DAC_COM, DAC_COMR, and DAC_RES (see Table 1 for definitions of those factors). The sample period is January 1980 to December 2005. 
